The Senate conducted confirmation hearings last week for President Bush's nominee to head the CIA, General Michael V. Hayden. The questions focussed on how Hayden might "fix" the CIA in light of its recent difficulties. These include low morale, a rash of resignations, and the controversial firing of a high-level employee for leaking information to the press.
A better question is whether the U.S. needs the CIA at all. This is different from asking whether the U.S. needs intelligence; the military can and does peform important aspects of that job. The right question is instead whether having an "independent" intelligence agency provides a more complete or balanced picture, and at what cost.
Given the secret nature of most CIA activities, it is impossible to know what security problems the CIA has averted over the past half century (the CIA was created in 1947). But we do know the CIA has been involved in serious breaches of its legal obligations and duties: spying on U.S. citizens, testing LSD on unknowing participants, funneling money to the Iran Contras. The CIA has also failed disastrously in its intelligence in at least two highly publicized cases, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and the Iraq WMD situation in 2003. More broadly, the CIA has undertaken interference with the internal affairs of other countries, such as Chile during Allende regime or the recruitment of an Army in Laos in the 1970s.
No agency can have a perfect track record. But most of what we know about the CIA's activities provides a grim assessment. Congress in principle conducts appropriate oversight, but again we do not know whether this is objective and thoughtful or highly politicized.
If intelligence is left to the military, many of the same problems arise, but with two differences that plausibly tilt the balance in a good direction. The military does not have a strong incentive to create new intelligence risks or expand the scope of its activities to justify its existence. And the military's internal budget contraint--the money its devotes to intelligence cannot support weapons or troops--would suggest some degree of internal evaluation about which kind of activity best promotes national security.
Living in a Dream World here, Doc. You say, "The military does not have a strong incentive to create new intelligence risks or expand the scope of its activities to justify its existence." Sure it does. In fact having DIA without the CIA is perfect for the Department of Defense. The DoD and it's component services will be able to find enemy capabilities all the time, without the counter-balance of the CIA and its NIE's. The "Bomber Gap" and the "Missile Gap" were all opposed by the CIA. They played into the hands of the US Air Force. Which segues into, "And the military's internal budget constraint--the money its devotes to intelligence cannot support weapons or troops--would suggest some degree of internal evaluation about which kind of activity best promotes national security." Each service will find an enemy of its own. The Air Force will focus on Chinese Aerospace forces, the Army on whatever army or ground force technology that grants IT most access to defense funds, and the Navy will, probably, focus on the Chinese PLA Navy and defense of the Taiwan Straits. I ma NOT a proponent of the "Military-Industrial Complex" or much of a supporter of the CIA, but your reasoning is unsound. Rest assured that the military will be able to find all sorts of intelligence justifying each services "Core values" and favourite programs.
Posted by: Joe | May 22, 2006 at 02:27 PM
Yeah, I think Joe makes some good points. The Pentagon spends billions it can't account for.
Posted by: Alan Brown | May 24, 2006 at 01:45 AM
Who exactly are the "Iran Contras"?
Posted by: asg | May 26, 2006 at 08:32 AM